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1. Introduction 
Revenue estimation practice in the U.S. has recently attracted widespread attention; a selection of 
papers include Diamond and Moomau (2003), Altshuler et al. (2005), Auerbach (2005), Carroll and 
Hrung (2005), Page (2005), Diamond (2005), Gale and Orszag (2005), Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006). 
In the present paper we discuss tax revenue estimation and present estimates of revenue effects of the 
2006 change in Norway’s personal income tax, contrasting estimates based on current non-behavioral 
methods with estimates that reflect that tax changes induce behavioral effects and generate effects 
from other tax bases.  
 Whereas the discussion in the U.S. case primarily concerns integrating dynamic, 
macroeconomic effects into revenue estimates, because of the ten-year budgeting period, the focus 
here is on revenue estimates for the next fiscal year. As in the U.S., see e.g., Auerbach (2005), current 
procedures of revenue projections in Norway can be categorized as 1) forecasts of revenues based on 
current policy, employing macro models and other types of information; and 2) predictions of revenue 
effects from suggested tax changes. In U.S. terminology, the first type is called baseline, the second 
scoring. We suggest that Norwegian scoring procedures could be improved. Firstly, they largely 
neglect the repercussions of changes in the personal income tax on behavior; secondly, they do not 
take into account the effect changes in the personal income tax can have on revenues from other tax 
bases, such as revenues from indirect and corporate taxes. In practical terms, it means that the budgets 
Parliament usually passes will be based on biased information of revenue effects, as decisions are 
based on estimates of changes in revenue that are not the expected ones. The practice came under 
particular scrutiny during work on drafting the last Norwegian reform of the personal income tax, i.e., 
the 2006 tax reform. The reform involved substantial tax reductions, and the difference between cost 
measures with and without behavioral effects was expected to be large. In particular the political 
parties in favor of deeper tax cuts commented on the absence of information on supply side effects in 
the revenue estimates, causing the revenue loss of the reform to be overestimated (Innst.S.nr.232 
2003-2004).  
 The main contribution of this paper comes from quantifying the deviation between 
estimates according to current practice and more ambitious methods, using the changes actuated by the 
2006 tax reform as an example. When the personal income tax is reduced, as was the case in 2005 and 
2006, rising post-tax income (for given pre-tax income) induces increased consumption, producing in 
consequence revenue from indirect tax bases. Moreover, the tax reductions influence labor supply 
incentives, resulting in increased personal income tax revenue through increased pre-tax incomes. The 
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rise in pre-tax income affects in turn the payroll tax levied on employers. And as pre-tax income rises, 
post-tax income and consumption rise too, leading to a new effect through indirect tax revenues.   
 The present paper provides estimates of magnitudes of the various effects involved, i.e., 
of behavioral effects and interactions with other tax bases. By summarizing them, we are able to 
compare aggregate measures following from this more ambitious approach to tax revenue estimation 
to “current practice” estimates. In this sense this paper also presents an estimate of the degree of self-
financing of tax cuts, as discussed by, e.g., Lindsey (1987); Feldstein (1995); Mankiw and Weinzierl 
(2006), and illustrated by the famous Laffer curve.  
 Methodologically, we rely on estimates based on micro data, using simulation models 
that are established in order to predict effects of tax changes. The personal income tax module, 
LOTTE-Skatt, which is part of the Norwegian tax-benefit model system LOTTE (Aasness, Dagsvik 
and Thoresen, 2007), was established precisely to calculate revenue effects and distributional effects 
of changes in the personal income tax. This module, combined with various macroeconomic 
projection procedures, is used to define baseline revenue estimates in the Norwegian system. With 
respect to scoring, the LOTTE-Skatt module provides revenue estimates that ignore important 
behavioral responses to tax rate changes, such as labor supply adjustments. To assess effects on labor 
supply of changes in the personal income tax, a new module was therefore constructed, known as 
LOTTE-Arbeid, and based on Dagsvik and Jia (2006). Estimates of changes in indirect tax revenue 
caused by changes in a detailed consumption vector with different tax rates are provided by the model 
KONSUM (Nygård and Aasness, 2003) with a complete demand system, which is also connected to 
Statistics Norway's macroeconomic models, the macroeconometric model MODAG (Boug et al., 
2002) and the CGE model MSG (Heide et al., 2004).  
 The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the current Norwegian system 
for calculating tax revenues in light of procedures in the U.S. Section 3 presents tax revenue estimates 
of the 2006 Norwegian tax reform as produced by this method. The tax reform resulted in loss of 
revenue, among other things because of lower marginal tax rates at high income levels. However, this 
estimate does not take into account that people usually work more to lower taxes, and in Section 4 we 
provide tax revenue estimates generated from labor supply adjustments to the new schedule, including 
effect through revenue from the payroll tax. In Section 5 we explore the interaction between changes 
in the personal income tax and revenues from other tax bases and present estimates of increases in 
indirect tax revenues. Section 6 summarizes results. 
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2. Current practice of scoring procedures 
Auerbach (2005) provides an outline of the pros and cons of dynamic scoring. Obviously, ignoring 
dynamic scoring could entail biased revenue estimates as important effects are neglected. It has also 
been argued that such procedures are politically biased, as tax cuts of the type we are considering here 
are seen as more costly than they really are. However, as noted by Gale and Orszag (2005), tax cuts do 
not necessarily lead to increased national income (and thereby increased revenues). Results may for 
instance depend on how the government closes the budget deficit, e.g., whether the initial reduction in 
revenue is matched by a reduction in government consumption.1 Arguments against dynamic scoring 
involve substantial uncertainty about effects and that methodological assumptions might be due to 
political pressure.  
 The U.S. scoring procedure discussion is reflective of the U.S. system’s longer planning 
horizons. Nevertheless, while the revenue estimates we have in mind here may be more short-sighted, 
we still have challenges to overcome regarding the selection of effects to be included in the scoring 
procedures. We have seen some efforts to systematize the effects. According to Slemrod’s three-tier 
behavioral response hierarchy (Slemrod 1992; 1995), the real responses are the most sluggish, timing 
the most responsive, with the third component, avoidance behavior, somewhere in the middle. Any 
behavioral response to taxation can therefore be classified on the basis of timing (or not) and reflection 
(or not) of tax avoidance or real behavior. Gravelle (1995) uses three categories to systematize 
responses: microeconomic effects and macroeconomic effects, where the latter is divided into two; 
cyclical effects, for instance arising from an underemployed economy; and more permanent effects 
that increase or decrease productive resources (labor and capital). Microeconomic effects include 
behavioral responses affecting the allocation of consumption or investment, and changes in timing and 
type of income received. In terms of Slemrod’s and Gravelle’s categorization schemes, the present 
paper focuses on real effects or permanent macroeconomic effects, such as labor supply effects, 
though the increase in consumption tax revenues following from increased post-tax income is 
considered a non-real microeconomic effect. Creedy and Duncan (2005) operate with first, second and 
third round effects of policy changes. The first round relates to fixed hours; the second to changes in 
desired hours of work; while third round effects allow for wage rate changes. The latter type of effects, 
often characterized as feedback effects, will not be considered here. Our main concern is with the 
difference between first and second round effects.2 
                                                     
1 For diverging views on effects of U.S. tax reforms, see Diamond (2005); Gale and Orszag (2005).  
2 Note also the literature on analytical expressions for tax revenue responsiveness, closely related to the topic of this paper; 
see e.g., Hutton and Lambert (1980), Creedy and Gemmell (1995). 
6 
 Another distinction often appearing in the scoring literature is that between static and 
dynamic scoring. The analysis here belongs to a static approach in the sense that we employ cross-
sectional information, discuss short-term revenue effects, and insofar as we want to detract from 
(dynamic) general equilibrium effects. This does not mean that we do not take behavioral changes into 
account, as estimates reflecting labor supply effects are presented; the labor supply microsimulations 
also exhibiting the heterogenous behavior of economic agents. Other behavioral effects, such as 
effects on investment decisions, are however not considered. In the case of labor supply adjustments, it 
can be argued that tax-payers take time to adjust to new schedules, and the demand side’s capacity to 
absorb changes can also be questioned. In this sense we measure effects in the first year that might not 
appear until later.  
 The Norwegian revenue estimation system is similar to the U.S. system as there is more 
than one agency involved. In the U.S., the Congressional Budget Office, see e.g., CBO (2006), 
provides baseline revenue estimates for 10-year periods, based on the most recent budgetary decisions 
and macroeconomic projections. Members of U.S. Congress derive forecasts of revenue effects from 
tax-law changes by the Joint Committee on Taxation, see e.g., JCT (2005). JCT use several 
microsimulation models to estimate revenue impact of changes in tax-laws. These revenue estimates 
bring in some behavioral effects of the tax changes. For instance, if a proposed tax schedule involves a 
change in the realization rate for capital gains, it is assumed that the tax-payers will change their 
timing of realizations. Similarly, when there are alterations in marginal tax rates, tax-payers are 
expected to change the form and the timing of income. However, tax revenues are unaffected by 
macroeconomic feedback effects as it is normally assumed that total income (or GNP) and other 
macroeconomic factors remain unchanged. This has caused some concern, and both JCT and CBO 
have recently produced more dynamic analyses of budget proposals, see CBO (2003) and JCT (2003). 
We also note the plans to create a dynamic analysis division within the Office of Tax Analysis in the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury (OTA, 2006). 
 In Norway the involved agencies are the Ministry of Finance and Statistics Norway. The 
projection period is usually shorter compared to the U.S., with the main focus being revenue of the 
coming year’s budget. One of the prime means of estimating revenue changes in the personal income 
tax in Norway is provided by the non-behavioral tax-benefit model LOTTE-Skatt (Aasness, Dagsvik 
and Thoresen, 2007). The model derives its data mainly from individual income tax returns. In order 
to project data to the year of interest, macroeconomic forecasts on key parameters are employed, 
including interest rate, the degree of unemployment, capital income growth, wage growth, etc. These 
predictions are partly derived from macroeconomic model simulations, produced by the MODAG 
model (Boug et al., 2002), developed by Statistics Norway and operated both by the Ministry of 
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Finance and Statistics Norway. Some of the capital income components – dividends, capital gains and 
interest expenses/incomes – are particularly difficult to project. The revenue according to the existing 
tax schedule is derived by a simulation where the current tax rule is applied to these data. For instance, 
when the lawmakers prepared the 2008 budget, they took the 2007 tax-law projected to 2008 as their 
point of reference. It was their baseline.  
 Next, the government establishes a budget proposal, the estimates of personal income tax 
revenue changes being largely derived from a non-behavioral LOTTE-Skatt simulation. This is 
scoring, according to U.S. terminology. However, model simulations will fail to pick up certain new 
tax rule changes. They are usually addressed outside the model. For instance, if a new savings scheme 
is launched which makes the tax-payer eligible for a tax credit, the revenue effect will depend on the 
take-up ratio of this scheme. It is usually the Ministry of Finance that comes up with these additional 
revenue change estimates by addressing information from other data sources. Such effects belong to 
what Gravelle (1995) terms microeconomic effects, and will be brought into consideration in 
discussions of alternative schedules suggested, for instance, by the Parliamentary opposition. It is the 
lack of precise information or realistic behavioral models that prevents us from addressing numerous 
microeconomic effects, such as income shifting and timing of income, in a more formal and precise 
manner. According to Slemrod’s behavioral response hierarchy (Slemrod, 1992; 1995), real effects, 
such as consumption and labor supply, are less elastic than timing responses and income shifting 
activities. However, as many tax-payers are unlikely to have wide opportunities to shift income, it will 
probably reduce the significance of such effects on revenues. 
 Some important induced effects are obviously left out, something certain sections of 
Parliament have criticized (Innst.S.nr.232 2003-2004). Revenue estimates do not control for changes 
in indirect taxation that come from changes in disposable income, and scoring procedures do not 
capture labor supply effects. Still, in the Norwegian context and from a practitioners' viewpoint, 
current procedures may have offered a practical framework for budget deliberations. It is because we 
now have access to more accurate information on behavioral effects and tax simulation tools of greater 
sophistication that we can begin to reconsider current procedures. In the next section we show revenue 
estimates produced by current procedures; the rest of the paper is devoted to discussing the effects of 
employing more ambitious scoring procedures. 
3. The Norwegian tax reform of 2006: revenue effects according 
to current procedures 
We employ tax revenue effects of the 2006 tax reform in order to discuss effects of different scoring 
procedures. As the tax reform was phased during 2005 and 2006, we compare revenues according to 
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the 2004 and 2006 schedules. The reform was considered necessary to address certain effects of the 
1992 dual income tax system. For instance, there was a desire to limit incentives for shifting income 
into capital income to benefit from the lower rate. Successful businesses found it advantageous to 
move out of the so-called split model, originally developed to divide business income between capital 
income and labor income for self-employed and owners of closely held firms; see Sørensen (2005) for 
the wider background to the reform and steps taken to adjust the dual income tax system, and 
Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2008) for empirical evidence on income shifting activities.  
 One important change provided for taxation of dividends both at the corporate and 
individual level in the new system. The 1992 reform involved only corporate level taxation. The tax on 
dividends is levied on incomes above a rate of return allowance.3 Obviously, this tax change 
influences behavior; whereas about 60 billion Norwegian kroner (NOK), corresponding to about 9.75 
billion U.S. dollars,4 was transferred to Norwegian households in 2004, prior to the reform, the 
estimates for 2006 was NOK18 billion (US$ 2.9 billion). This estimate, provided by the Ministry of 
Finance, includes timing effects, i.e., dividends were increased prior to the shareholder tax.5 Further, 
the dividend tax for 2006 was estimated at NOK 3.5–4 billion, including effects of increased capital 
gains taxation, which are taxed according to the same principles.   
 The new tax reform replaces the split model with a more general regulation: profit above 
a risk free rate of return is taxed according to a schedule very similar to that applied to wage income; 
see description of 2006 schedule in Figure 1. The social insurance contribution rate is higher for the 
self-employed: 10.7 percent as against 7.8 for wage earners. 
 Marginal tax rates on capital income and labor income also converged by reducing 
marginal tax rates on wages. This is shown in Figure 1. The Norwegian surtax system consists of two 
tiers on top of the basic tax rate at 28 percent and the social insurance contribution rate at 7.8 percent. 
In 2004 the former kicked in at approximately NOK380,000 at the rate of 13.5 percent, and the latter 
(19.5 percent) at approximately NOK970,000.6 Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of the reform on 
thresholds and rates. The maximum marginal tax rate fell from 55.3 to 47.8 percent, but starts working 
at a lower level, i.e., NOK800,000. To sum up, the reform effected a dramatic realignment of 
                                                     
3 Which means that the tax is levied on profit above a risk free rate of return. 
4 1 US dollar (US$) equalled 6.418 Norwegian kroner (NOK) on average in 2006. We use this exchange rate here and 
throughout the paper. 
5 This example also highlights the importance of focusing on different tax bases simultaneously: the reduction in dividends 
will be reflected by increases in retained earnings. A non-symmetrical tax treatment of incomes at the individual and the 
corporate level may induce revenue effects from such behavioral changes. 
6 All thresholds are adjusted to 2006 levels to make them comparable. 
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maximum marginal tax rates on capital income and wage income: from 28 and 55.3 percent 
respectively in 2004, to 48.2 and 47.8 percent in 2006.7    
 In order to ease distributional effects, the wage income standard deduction was increased. 
It is constructed by multiplying wage income by a rate (24 percent in 2004) and constrained by a 
maximum amount (NOK50,780 in 2004 in terms of wage adjusted 2006 kroner). In 2006 the rate went 
up to 34 percent, and maximum deduction to NOK61,100. There were some other changes as well, 
among them, tax on income generated by owner-occupied homes was phased out. 
 
Figure 1. Marginal tax rates on wage income, 2004 and 2006. All thresholds adjusted to 2006 
level 
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 Before presenting revenue estimates as produced by current procedures, we should 
explain the notation. R symbolizes revenue. As this paper seeks to highlight the importance of 
including effects on various tax bases, we keep them separate by introducing iR for revenues from tax 
base { }INDCORPPIii ,,: ∈ , where PIR is revenue from personal income taxes, CORPR symbolizes 
                                                     
7 The figure for marginal capital tax in 2006 is derived as follows: capital is taxed by 28 percent at the corporate level, the 
rest (72 percent) being transferred to the individual and taxed by 28 at the margin (above the rate of return allowance): 72 
percent multiplied by 0.28 gives 20.16 percent, which is added to the corporate level rate.  
10 
revenue from the corporate income tax, while INDR is revenue from indirect taxes.8 Thus, we employ 
the notation jiR , where we let subscript j indicate the effects included in revenue estimates: { }LNj ,∈ , 
where N refers to revenue estimates without behavioral effects, i.e., the form of the estimate generated 
by the tax-benefit model LOTTE-Skatt for the personal income tax; L indicates incorporation of labor 
supply effects. A standard revenue estimate from the (non-behavioral) LOTTE-Skatt is symbolized by 
PIRN. 
 Let us consider estimates of revenue costs of the reform according to prevailing 
administrative procedures. Table 1 presents revenue estimates for the personal income tax, as derived 
from a simulation of the tax-benefit model LOTTE-Skatt, comparing 2004 and 2006 schedules. Before 
adding the effects of consumption and labor supply, the overall cost of the reform is estimated to be 
NOK8.3 billion (US$1.29 billion), with a reduction in total tax burden for wage earners slightly in 
excess of NOK8.6 billion (US$1.34 billion). 
 
Table 1.  Personal income tax: estimates of total tax revenues and revenue changes from the 
2006 reform. Results from tax-benefit model LOTTE-Skatt, in million NOK*  
Revenue change: ΔPIRN 2004 rules applied to 
2006: PIRN 
2006 rules applied to 
2006: PIRN For all tax-payers For wage earners 
248,346 240,047 -8,299 -8,578 
*1US$=NOK6.418 according to 2006 exchange rates. 
4. Labor supply effects 
As already noted above, current tax policy simulation procedures ignore labor supply effects. Many 
contributions to the literature attest to significant labor supply responses with respect to changes in 
wages and taxes, see for example the survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). With respect to the 
example employed in the current paper, if we ignore labor supply effects of taxation, the revenue loss 
is exaggerated, as emphasized by the Laffer curve reasoning. In this section we discuss the effect on 
revenues of including labor supply effects for the wage earners, by applying the sub-module LOTTE-
Arbeid of the LOTTE model system (Aasness, Dagsvik and Thoresen, 2007).9 
 The module includes separately estimated labor supply models for married/cohabiting, 
single males and single females, based on a particular discrete choice framework developed by 
                                                     
8 This list of tax bases is not complete; for instance personal wealth taxes are included in PIR while revenue from the 
inheritance tax is not. 
9 Carroll and Hrung (2005) argue that estimates of the taxable income elasticity are relevant in this context, as they reflect a 
broad range of responses to tax changes. Instead of using a labor simulation model, we could have used the main estimate in 
Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) along the same lines as seen in Carroll and Hrung (2005).   
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Dagsvik (1994). Insofar as it gives fundamental importance to the notion of job choice  the approach 
differs from standard discrete choice models of labor supply. Specifically, workers are assumed to 
have preferences over a latent worker-specific choice set of jobs from which they choose their most 
preferred job. A job is characterized by fixed (job-specific) working hours and other non-pecuniary 
attributes. As a result, observed hours of work is interpreted as the job-specific (fixed) hours of work 
associated with the chosen job. This modeling approach has been used in a number of applications, 
most recently by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). We explain the model further in the Appendix, but see 
Dagsvik and Jia (2006) for detailed setup and estimates of the model. 
 Three versions of the model are estimated on a sample of Norwegian microdata from 
1997: a joint model for married couples and two separate models for single females and males. 
Aggregate wage elasticities are calculated for all model versions, see the Appendix. The elasticities 
indicate a moderately elastic labor supply for married females, but less elastic for males and single 
females, consonant with the main findings in the literature, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). The 
overall wage elasticities are 0.6 and 0.004 for married/cohabiting and single females, respectively, and 
estimates for married/cohabiting and single males 0.08 and 0.03 respectively.  These average estimates 
do not differ much from corresponding elasticities estimated on another Norwegian dataset from 1994, 
by Aaberge and Colombino (2006).10 They are also in the vicinity of what Evers, de Mooij and van 
Vuuren (2005) report as median estimates for males and females in their meta analysis of labor supply 
elasticities.  
 Revenue estimates controlling for labor supply adjustments can be seen in Table 2. Note 
that the revenue effects from labor supply adjustments are presented as reduced reductions in personal 
income tax revenue loss, that is, as negative values in Table 2. As expected, employing a labor supply 
model reduces the estimate of revenue costs of the reform, from approximately NOK8.6 billion to 
NOK6.4 billion. By comparing the estimates of revenues presented in Table 1 and Table 2, an estimate 
of the offsetting effects with respect to the personal income tax can be readily obtained. 
Approximately 25 percent11 of the initial cost is returned as a result of labor supply adjustments when 
we use the initial revenue effect with respect to wage earners for comparison. This estimate obviously 
depends on this actual example, e.g., the composition of this tax reform,12 employment of the 2006 
                                                     
10 However, there are some variations for elasticities across different income deciles between our results and these of 
Aaberge and Colombino (2006). We believe these differences can be explained by different model specifications and data 
used for estimation. Although these two studies are based on the same general framework, there are considerable differences 
in the respective model specifications. 
11 The difference between NOK8.578 billion and NOK 6.391 billion, divided by NOK8.578 billion. 
12 In fact, this problem can be alleviated by decomposing into effects of increases in standard deductions, reductions in 
marginal tax rates, etc., as seen in Finansministeriet (2002, p. 330). 
12 
income distribution pattern, validity of the labor supply model, parameter uncertainty of labor supply 
model, etc. However, it gives an indication of the magnitude of this effect.   
 
Table 2.  Estimates of revenue effects of the 2006 reform when labor supply adjustments are 
included, compared to non-behavioral estimate. In million NOK* 
ΔPIRN (wage earners) ΔPIRL ΔCORPRL 
-8,578 -6,391 818 
*1US$=NOK6.418 
 
The labor supply effects affect more than the revenue of the personal income tax. As pre-tax incomes 
rise, they will affect the revenue of the payroll tax, and since post-tax incomes and consumption are 
rising, the indirect tax revenue is also affected by changes in labor supply.13 Let us also briefly present 
the effects through the payroll tax, before we in the next section describe the contributions from 
indirect tax revenues. 
 The Norwegian payroll tax is differentiated with respect to geography into 5 zones. In 
2006 14.1 percent of gross labor income was charged in zone 1 (representing 77 percent of the 
population). It decreases in the other zones according to remoteness from zone 1, ending with a zero 
tax rate in zone 5. In order to simplify calculations, we employ an estimate for the average payroll tax 
rate in 2006 of 13.2 percent. An estimate of the additional revenue from corporate taxes because of 
labor supply adjustments, ΔCORPRL, is derived by multiplying this rate by the increase in gross 
income according to labor supply model simulations. The estimated increase in corporate tax revenues 
is NOK818 million, as seen in Table 2. 
5. Revenue effects through increased consumption 
In order to obtain revenue effects from indirect tax bases we apply a macroeconomic consumption 
function: 
(1) { },j jTCE MPC DISP j N LΔ = Δ ∈   
where ΔTCEj is the change in total consumption expenditure, dependent on whether we address 
revenue estimates from a standard LOTTE-Skatt simulation (N) or also take labor supply effects into 
account through a LOTTE-Arbeid simulation (L). Further, MPC is the marginal propensity to 
consume, and ΔDISPj is the change in disposable income determining the maximum amount available 
                                                     
13 Another interesting extension is to bring in changes in wage rates and the effect on revenues, so-called third-round effects, 
as discussed in Creedy and Duncan (2001). 
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for consumption at the margin. According to the standard tax-benefit model calculation, we have that 
ΔDISPN = - ΔPIRN = NOK8,299 mill., see Table 1. Moreover, the additional increase in disposable 
income due to the labor supply response (ΔDISPL) is estimated to be NOK4,006 mill.  
 The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of disposable income may depend on the 
current macroeconomic situation, not least of which is consumers' expectations of future income. 
Were the Ministry of Finance to replicate the tax analysis of the present paper when drafting the 
budget, we would advise using an MPC in line with the budget’s wider macroeconomic assumptions.14 
In the present paper we use MPC = 0.8.  
 The change in indirect tax revenues (INDRj) is computed by  
(2) { },j jINDR MITR TCE j N LΔ = Δ ∈  
where MITR is the marginal indirect tax rate when total consumption expenditure is increased by one 
unit.  
 Assuming a system of demand functions, or more simply a system of Engel functions, the 
marginal indirect tax rate of increasing total consumption expenditure by one unit (MITR) is given by  
(3) g g gg GMITR t w E∈=∑   
where g stands for commodity group g, G is the set of all commodity groups, tg is the tax rate for 
commodity g including value added tax, excise taxes, and adjusted for subsidies, wg is the budget share 
for commodity g, and Eg is the Engel elasticity for commodity group g. Note that the tax rates (tg) and 
MITR are measured in percentage of consumer prices (i.e. post-tax prices). Thus, for a country with a 
value added tax of 25 percent on all commodities, and no excise taxes or subsidies, we will have tg and 
MITR equal to 0.25/1.25 = 0.2. 
 To derive MITR for Norway we used the model KONSUM, a micro based macro model 
with a complete system of demand functions for 60 commodities, see Aasness and Holtsmark (1993) 
and Nygård and Aasness (2003) on earlier versions.15 Our results on MITR were close to 0.2. In 
Norway we have a general VAT of 25 percent, implying an MITR  of  0.2 when we focus on first-
round effects of taxation. Lower VAT rates on some commodity groups, in particular food (13 
percent), would give lower MITRs, while excise taxes on cars, petrol, tobacco, alcohol, electricity, etc. 
would increase the MITR. Summing up all the effects according to (4), it turns out that MITR is close 
to 0.2. We are therefore using this parameter value in the present analysis.   
                                                     
14 See Boug et al. (2002) for a description of the main macroeconomic model (MODAG), which is used by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
15 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance uses a version of this model in their preparation of National Budgets. 
14 
 Estimated changes in indirect tax revenues (ΔINDRj) are presented in Table 3. We see 
that approximately NOK1.3 billion in revenue is obtained from the first round direct effect (ΔINDRN), 
as described by standard tax-benefit model simulations, while additionally approximately NOK0.6 
billion is attained by also including effects on indirect tax revenues from increased labor supply 
(ΔINDRL). 
 
Table 3.  Estimates of revenue effects from indirect taxation of the 2006 reform. In million 
NOK* 
ΔPIRN ΔINDRN ΔINDRL 
-8,299 1,328 640 
*1US$=NOK6.418 
6. Concluding remarks 
The main point of this paper is to question current procedures of providing information about revenue 
effects of changes in the personal income tax. If one incorporates the effects from labor supply 
responses, the costs of the 2006 reform is substantially reduced. The paper also demonstrates the 
benefit of including effects on other tax bases as well. Obviously, lower taxes will affect the revenue 
from consumption taxes and labor supply responses will affect the revenue from payroll taxes.  
 Table 4 summarizes the revenue effects addressed in this paper.16 To calculate an overall 
rate of self-financing with respect to the reform we have addressed here, we define an estimated 
overall counteracting effect, OECE, by 
(4) ( )L N N L LOECE PIR PIR INDR INDR CORPR= Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ . 
After feeding figures from Table 4 we obtain OECE = NOK4,694 mill., which is equal to 56 percent 
of the initial cost estimate, ΔPIRN. The degree of self-financing in this case is therefore approximately 
56 percent. Of course, this estimate depends on the nature of the income distribution employed, the 
actual tax reform we are considering, etc. Nevertheless, we are convinced of the usefulness of these 
estimates because they get closer to the expected costs of tax cuts engendered by changes in the 
personal income tax. 
 
                                                     
16 Note that the estimate of revenue effect of labor supply adjustments differs from the figure given in Section 4, as the base 
here is the change in revenue for all tax-payers, whereas we restricted to wage earners in Section 4. 
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Table 4.  Summary of revenue effects, in million NOK* and in percent compared to the first 
round effect   
2006 tax-rules 
2004-rules applied to 
2006: PIRN ΔPIRN ΔINDRN 
ΔPIRL-
ΔPIRN 
ΔINDRL  ΔCORPRL OECE 
248,345 -8,299 1,328 1,908 640 818 4,694 
% of -ΔPIRN  16 % 23 % 8 % 10 % 56 % 
*1US$=NOK6.418 
 
 Obviously, the ability of this estimate of self-financing to survive after other effects are 
included is unresolved. The discussion over the U.S. case concerns effects over a longer time 
perspective, which raises a number of additional issues including the sort of steps taken to balance 
budgets.  
Related to this, and given that we have a more short-sighted fiscal policy objective in the 
Norwegian case, some may ask why our calculations do not include expenditure side effects of policy 
changes. Tax cuts well generally need to be offset by spending cuts and many changes will have 
substantial effect on the tax revenues. For instance, changing the state sickness benefit will affect labor 
supply, and changing  child care subsidies will affect the labor supply of parents of preschool children. 
Thus, the estimates one has at one’s disposal should be realistic in terms both of budget expenditures 
and incomes (and their interaction), and employ behavioral simulation models. This is demanding not 
least because it requires high quality modeling tools. It should nevertheless be one’s ambition in this 
type of work. 
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Appendix 
The labor supply model in brief 
Discrete hours models are popular in tax policy micro simulation, because they obviate the need for 
marginal calculations, cf. e.g., van Soest (1995) and the review by Creedy and Kalb (2005). 
Specifically, they enable the researcher to straightforwardly apply quite general specifications of the 
utility function and incorporate taxation and social security details. They often fail, however, when it 
comes to replicating the peaks on full-time and part-time hours that typically characterize the 
distribution of working hours (especially in Europe). Moreover the standard discrete choice approach 
and the conventional continuous model neglect the demand driven restrictions on the set of job 
opportunities available to workers. More importantly, however, the overall number of working 
opportunities varies across individuals: highly educated professionals typically enjoy several job 
opportunities; the low skilled have fewer to choose from – or none at all. 
 The labor supply model applied in this paper is based on Dagsvik (1994), Dagsvik and 
Strøm (2006) and Dagsvik and Jia (2006). In contrast to the approach described above where the 
household is restricted to have preferences solely over combinations of total consumption and hours of 
work of the partners, we let the agent have preferences over nonpecuniary job attributes such as the 
kind of job-specific tasks to be performed, location of the workplace, etc. We have estimated models 
for married couples, single men and single woman separately. But for simplicity’s sake, in the 
following we restrict our discussion to the single-person household.17  
 Individuals are assumed to choose from a set of jobs denoted by index k. Job k has fixed 
working hours Hk. The wage rate is assumed to be specific to the individual and is denoted as w. For a 
given number of hours of work h, D(h) denotes the agent’s set of available jobs with hours of work h, 
i.e. ( ) { | ( ) }D h z H z h= = . We denote the number of jobs in D(h) as m(h). For the non-market 
alternative one can normalize such that (0) 1m = . 
 Let ( ), ,k kU C H Z be the utility function of the household, where C denotes household 
consumption (disposable income) and Zk accommodates the notion that workers may have preferences 
for job types in addition to income and hours of work.  
 For given job k, the economic budget constraints is given by  
( , )k k kC H w I t H w I= + − , 
                                                     
17 See Dagsvik and Jia (2006) for a more detailed exposition. 
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where ),( IwHt k is the tax function, and I denotes the non-labor income. All the details of the 
tax/social security rules are taken into account in this function.    
 We assume that the utility function has the form 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,k k k kU C H Z v C H Zε= , 
where v(⋅) is a positive deterministic function and ε(z) is a positive random taste-shifter. Let 
( | , , )h w I tϕ denote the probability of the agent choosing a particular job with advertized hours h, given 
the wage rate w, non-labor income is I and the tax rules represented by function t. Under suitable 
distributional assumptions of the error term { }( )kZε , it can be shown that   
( ( , ), ) ( )( | , , ) .
( ( , ), ) ( )
x
v hw I t hw I h m hh w I t
v xw I t xw I h m x
+ −ϕ = + −∑  
We see that the probability of the agent choosing a job with working hours h has a relatively simple 
form. It is analogous to a multinomial logit model with representative utility terms 
( ( , ), )v hw I t hw I h+ −  weighted with the frequencies of feasible jobs. Unfortunately, since ( )m h is not 
directly observable, we can often only identify the product ( ), ( )v C h m h  nonparametrically. 
Parametric/functional form assumptions on ( ),v C h and ( )m h are required for estimation and 
simulation of the model. In general, the structural part, v(C,h), is specified as a function of observable 
personal attributes such as age, number of children, etc. We assume that m(h) is a uniform density 
except for peaks at full-time and part-time hours. The full/part-time peak in the hours distribution 
captures institutional restrictions and technological constraints. 
 The model is then estimated by the maximum likelihood method on merged data based on 
the 1997 Norwegian Labor force survey and another two register data sets containing additional 
information on incomes, family composition, children and education. We consider only households 
where the male is working. Three models are estimated separately on married couples, single males 
and single females. The models fit the data rather well.  
Wage elasticities 
In labor supply models based on the discrete choice framework, the standard labor supply function is 
not estimated. However, we can still use the concept of the wage elasticity of labor supply to describe 
the impact of wage rate change on labor supply behavior. In Tables A.1 and A.2 we report what we 
have called aggregate uncompensated elasticities. They are calculated as follows. For each household 
we simulate the change in the choice probabilities of working and expected hours of work for the 
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female and the male resulting from a 10 percent increase in the wage rates. Subsequently, we 
aggregate over the sample to obtain the corresponding change in mean probability of working and 
mean expected hours of work. To obtain elasticities, we multiply these figures by 10 and divide by the 
respective mean probability of working and the mean expected hours of work. Note that since we have 
excluded the households where the male is not working, for males, we can only calculate the wage 
elasticities conditional on working. However, the point estimates for the wage elasticities for married 
and unmarried males, 0.08 and 0.03 respectively, are in the vicinity of median estimates provided by 
Evers, de Mooij and van Vuuren (2005) for males in their meta analyses.  
 In general, the tables show that the uncompensated wage elasticities are moderate for 
married females but small for males and single females. This is consistent with of the several studies 
surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999): singles and males in couples tend to have lower labor 
supply elasticity than secondary earners, i.e. females in couples. For married females the own wage 
elasticity of the probability of working is equal to 0.33, which means that if the wage rates of married 
females increase by 5 percent (say) the aggregate fraction of married female who works will increase 
by 1.5 percent.  If the wage rate of the female and the male increase, the corresponding elasticity of 
the probability of working is equal to 0.223. Conditional on working the wage elasticity of mean hours 
of work is equal to 0.279 for married females. We also note that the elasticities conditional on income 
groups decrease slightly by income for females but increase slightly for males. However, the 
elasticities with respect to a change in both wage rates remain practically constant over income groups. 
The corresponding unconditional elasticities for the females measure the response on total mean hours 
of work as a result of wage changes. In Table A.1 we note that the unconditional elasticities for 
married females range from 0.71 in the lowest decile to 0.52 in the highest decile of disposable 
income. The figure for all married is 0.61, somewhat higher than the mean value for females reported 
in the meta analysis by Evers, de Mooij and van Vuuren (2005). However, Table A2 shows that 
unmarried females are much less responsive; an estimate of the (unconditional) wage elasticity of 
0.004. 
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Table A.1. Uncompensated wage elasticities for married couples  
  
Female 
base 
value 
Male 
base 
Value 
Female 
own wage
elasticity 
Female cross 
wage 
elasticity 
Male 
own wage 
elasticity 
Male 
cross 
wage 
elasticity 
Female 
elasticity 
with respect 
to both wage 
rates 
Male 
elasticity 
with 
respect to
both wage
rates 
Whole 
sample 0.89  0.333 -0.141   0.223  
Lowest 
decile 0.87  0.420 -0.181   0.276  
2nd to 8th 
decile 0.90  0.332 -0.141   0.223  
Probability 
of working 
Highest 
decile 0.92  0.249 -0.090   0.174  
Whole 
sample 1601 2015 0.279 -0.086 0.077 -0.015 0.197 0.063 
Lowest 
decile 1581 2002 0.289 -0.089 0.067 -0.015 0.205 0.053 
2nd to 8th 
decile 1602 2015 0.279 -0.087 0.077 -0.015 0.196 0.063 
Mean hours 
of work, 
conditional 
on 
working 
Highest 
decile 1618 2030 0.272 -0.083 0.090 -0.014 0.193 0.076 
Un-
conditional 
mean hours 
of work 
Whole 
sample 1444  0.612 -0.228   0.418  
 
 
Table A.2. Uncompensated wage elasticities for single individuals  
 
Male base 
value 
Male wage 
elasticity 
Female base 
value 
Female wage 
elasticity 
Probability of working   0.97 0.023 
Mean hours of work conditional on working 1982 0.03 1766 0.002 
Unconditional mean hours of work   1720 0.004 
 
 
 
